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I. A love that could not last 
 
The story of Soering (1989) seemed an unlikely candidate for the seminal case 
of the Strasbourg Court on refoulement.1 For two decades, the European 
Commission of Human Rights (a monitoring body whose decisions could be 
submitted for review to the Court) had held that Article 3 ECHR prohibits 
refoulement, i.e. expulsion if there is a real risk that the expellee will suffer ill-
treatment in the country of origin. 2 Many of those cases were lodged by 
failed asylum seekers which might raise general sympathy more easily than 
Soering’s case - a brutal murderer.  
 
Young students at the University of Virginia, Jens Soering and Elizabeth 
Hayes fell in love in 1985.3 But Hayes’ parents vehemently opposed the 
relationship and in an escalated row in March 1986 with the young couple, 
they were stabbed to death with a knife. Jens Soering and Elizabeth Hayes 
fled to the United Kingdom, where Soering killed two metropolitan 
policemen. Upon arrest of the couple in 1987, the United States requested 
extradition of Soering and Hayes. The UK was willing to oblige. Elizabeth 
Hayes was surrendered, trialed, and sentenced to two times 45 years of 
imprisonment. The UK would happily have extradited Soering too, but he 
invoked Article 3 ECHR.  
  
Soering feared that in Virginia, he would be sentenced to death. The 
circumstances surrounding the trial, in particular the expected sojourn on 
“death row” where he would have to wait for the execution possibly for 
years, would necessarily cause much suffering and anguish. The Court 
accepted that this would constitute inhuman or degrading treatment as meant 
in Article 3. It also accepted that this consequence of the extradition could be 
ascribed to the United Kingdom. Hence, it adopted the Soering doctrine: 
 
“the decision by a Contracting State to extradite a fugitive may give rise to an issue under 
Article 3 […] where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person 
                                                
∗ Dr. Hemme Battjes is senior lecturer at the Law faculty of VU University, Amsterdam, the 
Netherlands. 
1 ECtHR 7 July 1989, no. 14038/88, Ser. A 161(Soering v the United Kingdom).  
2 Until 1998, the European Commission on Human Rights decided on the admissibility of 
appeals (cf. P. van Dijk & F. van Hoof et al. (eds.), Theory and Practice of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, Antwerp: Intersentia 2006, p. 32f.). It could examine the merits, 
but it could also bring the case before the Court – as it did in Soering.  
3 See for the facts Soering, paras. 12-16. 
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concerned, if extradited, faces a real risk of being subjected to torture or to inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment in the requesting country”.4 
 
After the ruling, the United Kingdom got assurances from the United States 
that the death sentence would not be imposed. And upon extradition in 
1990, Jens Soering was convicted to two life sentences.5  So in the end, all 
parties got what they wanted: Soering protection from death row, the UK the 
extradition and Virginia the trial. Maybe Soering was not such an unlikely 
candidate for the first judgment on refoulement, after all.  
 
The importance of the ruling in Soering for migration law in Europe is 
uncontestable. It has become generally accepted that in case of a real risk of 
inhuman treatment in the country of origin, Article 3 ECHR forbids 
expulsion. This holds true not only for extradition of alleged criminals like 
Soering, but also for expulsion of people seeking asylum in Europe.6 
Recently, the EU Qualification Directive codified the prohibition of 
refoulement in a definition of persons eligible for asylum.7 As the first 
judgment wherein the Court adopted (or confirmed) this prohibition of 
refoulement coined by the European Commission on Human Rights, Soering 
merits a place in any historical overview on migration law in Europe.  
But the judgment provokes more than mere historical interest. It 
merits re-examination because in no later case, the Court elaborated in such 
detail why Article 3 ECHR applies to expulsion cases. Analysis of its 
reasoning furthermore reveals an approach to interpretation that, implicitly 
or explicitly, has extended and limited scope and content of asylum 
protection under the European Convention ever since.  
 
II. Why Article 3 ECHR does not prohibit re foulement  
 
Nowadays, almost twenty years after Soering, the applicability of the 
Convention to migration cases has become so firmly entrenched in European 
legal thinking that it takes some difficulty to appreciate the interpretation 
effort faced by the Court. It had to address two major arguments why the 
UK was fully entitled to extradite Soering. First, the Convention simply does 
not forbid expulsion. As an exception to the established principle that a state 
may control entry and residence of aliens on its territory, a prohibition on 
expulsion should be laid down expressis verbis, as for example Article 3 of the 
United Nations Convention Against Torture, which provides that “no State 
Party shall expel, return ("refoule") or extradite a person where there are 
substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being 
                                                
4 Soering, para. 91.  
5 R.H. Lawson and H.G. Schermers, Leading cases of the European Court of Human Rights, 
Nijmegen: Ars Aequi 1999, p. 328. 
6 ECtHR 20 March 1993, no. 15576/89, Ser. A 201(Cruz Varas v. Sweden).  
7 Albeit in slightly different terms – see Article 2(e) read in conjunction with 15(b) of the 
Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and 
status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need 
international protection and the content of the protection granted (OJ L 304, 30.9.2004).  
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subjected to torture”. Article 3 ECHR merely states that “[n]o one shall be 
subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”, 
making no reference to removal, extradition or refoulement. No Convention 
provision states liability for what might happen after extradition. On the 
contrary, proposals to add a Protocol stating a right to asylum and a 
prohibition on expulsion failed.8 Second, Article 1 ECHR limits 
responsibility to “acts to persons within the territory” of the UK. Therefore, 
the Convention could not possibly apply to Soering’s treatment in the USA, 
not even if one tried for some extensive interpretation.  
 
III. The jurisdiction argument 
 
In Soering the Court tackles both arguments. It starts from acknowledging 
that “no right not to be extradited is as such protected by the Convention”.9 
So as a matter of principle, the UK’s right to control the presence of aliens 
on its territory is not contested. However, 
 
“in so far as a measure of extradition has consequences adversely affecting the enjoyment 
of a Convention right, it may, assuming that the consequences are not too remote, attract 
the obligations of a Contracting State under the relevant Convention guarantee (see, 
mutatis mutandis, the Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali judgment of 25 May 1985, Series 
A no. 94, pp. 31-32, §§ 59-60 - in relation to rights in the field of immigration).”10 
 
As any other exercise of sovereignty (maintenance of law and order by means 
of criminal law, for example), it is subject to ECHR requirements, and the 
mere circumstance that Soering’s case happens to concern control of aliens’ 
presence does not alter that. This important step it had already made in 
Abdulaziz two years before Soering. That case concerned a refusal to issue 
resident permits to the foreign husbands of three foreign women living in the 
UK. This refusal affected the family life of the women, in the opinion of the 
Court, and hence fell within the ambit of Article 8 ECHR.  
But an analogy with Abdulaziz can not answer the question whether 
Article 3 applies in Soerings case. In Abdulaziz, the affected women were 
within UK jurisdiction, whereas Soering's ill-treatment (death row) would 
occur outside it. So the Court moves on to address the jurisdiction issue: 
 
                                                
8 See G. Noll, Negotiating Asylum, The Hague/Boston/London: Nijhoff 2000, p. 401 with 
further references.  
9 Soering, para. 85. In Soering, the Court deduced this from Article 5, “As results from Article 
5 § 1 (f) (art. 5-1-f), which permits "the lawful ... detention of a person against whom action 
is being taken with a view to ... extradition", no right not to be extradited is as such 
protected by the Convention.” This is not conclusive as Noll has argued (Noll 2000, supra 
note 8 p. 408-409). Indeed, in later judgments the Court states instead that “Contracting 
States have the right, as a matter of well-established international law and subject to their 
treaty obligations including Article 3, to control the entry, residence and expulsion of 
aliens” (cf. ECtHR 30 October 1991, no. 13163/87, Ser. A 215 (Vilvarajah et al. v. UK) para. 
102).  
10 Ibid.  
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“What is at issue in the present case is whether Article 3 can be applicable when the 
adverse consequences of extradition are, or may be, suffered outside the jurisdiction of the 
extraditing State as a result of treatment or punishment administered in the receiving State. 
Article 1 of the Convention, which provides that "the High Contracting Parties shall secure 
to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I", sets a 
limit, notably territorial, on the reach of the Convention. In particular, the engagement 
undertaken by a Contracting State is confined to "securing" ("reconnaître" in the French 
text) the listed rights and freedoms to persons within its own "jurisdiction". Further, the 
Convention does not govern the actions of States not Parties to it, nor does it purport to 
be a means of requiring the Contracting States to impose Convention standards on other 
States. […]. 
In the instant case it is common ground that the United Kingdom has no power over the 
practices and arrangements of the Virginia authorities which are the subject of the 
applicant’s complaints. It is also true that in other international instruments cited by the 
United Kingdom Government - for example the 1951 United Nations Convention relating 
to the Status of Refugees (Article 33), the 1957 European Convention on Extradition 
(Article 11) and the 1984 United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Article 3) - the problems of removing 
a person to another jurisdiction where unwanted consequences may follow are addressed 
expressly and specifically. 
These considerations cannot, however, absolve the Contracting Parties from responsibility 
under Article 3 for all and any foreseeable consequences of extradition suffered outside 
their jurisdiction.”11 
 
There can be no question of UK liability for the actual infliction of inhuman 
treatment, because it does not control the American authorities. Nor can the 
UK be held co-responsible for such treatment, because the US are not bound 
by the Convention and hence not responsible themselves. Still, the UK 
remains responsible for acts within its jurisdiction: the act of expulsion. So 
Article 1 limits, but does not completely rule out responsibility under Article 
3: it can be applicable if the adverse effects of removal are suffered outside 
the state’s jurisdiction. Whether it is applicable still remains to be decided.   
 
IV. Interpretation principles 
 
Before addressing this question, the Court first sets out a number of 
“interpretation principles”: 
 
“In interpreting the Convention regard must be had to its special character as a treaty for 
the collective enforcement of human rights and fundamental freedoms (see the Ireland v. 
the United Kingdom judgment of 18 January 1978, Series A no. 25, p. 90, § 239). Thus, the 
object and purpose of the Convention as an instrument for the protection of individual 
human beings require that its provisions be interpreted and applied so as to make its 
safeguards practical and effective (see, inter alia, the Artico judgment of 13 May 1980, 
Series A no. 37, p. 16, § 33). In addition, any interpretation of the rights and freedoms 
guaranteed has to be consistent with "the general spirit of the Convention, an instrument 
designed to maintain and promote the ideals and values of a democratic society" […]”.12 
 
A treaty for the “collective enforcement of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms”, that is, a treaty containing erga omnes obligations (obligations 
                                                
11 Ibid. 
12 Soering, para. 87. 
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towards the community as a whole);13 safeguards that should be “practical 
and effective”; and a “general spirit” requiring promotion of “ideals and 
values of a democratic society” – all these principles do not address the 
question under consideration, except that they suggest a wide, inclusive 
interpretation of the Convention.  
The Court then turns to the characteristics of Article 3 ECHR in 
particular:  
 
“Article 3 makes no provision for exceptions and no derogation from it is permissible 
under Article 15 in time of war or other national emergency. This absolute prohibition of 
torture and of inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under the terms of the 
Convention shows that Article 3 enshrines one of the fundamental values of the 
democratic societies making up the Council of Europe. It is also to be found in similar 
terms in other international instruments such as the 1966 International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights and the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights and is generally 
recognised as an internationally accepted standard”.14  
 
Thus, Article 3 ECHR is “a fundamental value”. This fundamentality follows 
from the ECHR itself – Article 3 ECHR does not allow for “exceptions” or 
“derogations”. What is more, this prohibition is found “in similar terms”, 
hence in non-derogable terms, in other treaties and hence an “internationally 
accepted standard”. Non-derogability and universal acceptance: these are the 
characteristics of jus cogens (although the Court does not label the prohibition 
on ill-treatment that way).15 Fundamentality, non-derogability, maybe jus 
cogens – all these characteristics strengthen the call for an inclusive 
interpretation.  
 
V. A fundamental value prohibits refoulement 
 
Then, the Court finally turns to stating and answering the main question:  
 
“The question remains whether the extradition of a fugitive to another State where he 
would be subjected or be likely to be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment would itself engage the responsibility of a Contracting State under 
Article 3. That the abhorrence of torture has such implications is recognised in Article 3 of 
the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, which provides that "no State Party shall ... extradite a person 
where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being 
subjected to torture". The fact that a specialised treaty should spell out in detail a specific 
obligation attaching to the prohibition of torture does not mean that an essentially similar 
obligation is not already inherent in the general terms of Article 3 of the European 
Convention. It would hardly be compatible with the underlying values of the Convention, 
that "common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law" to which 
the Preamble refers, were a Contracting State knowingly to surrender a fugitive to another 
                                                
13 Lawson 1999, supra note 5, pp. 169-170 points out that the consideration in Ireland v UK 
whereto reference is made in Soering appears to qualify the whole of the European 
Convention as erga omnes obligations. 
14 Soering, para. 88. 
15 See Lawson 1999, supra note 5, pp. 175-6 and H. Battjes, ‘In search for a fair balance 
The absolute character of the prohibition of refoulement under Article 3 ECHR 
reassessed’, (forthcoming).  
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State where there were substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of 
being subjected to torture, however heinous the crime allegedly committed. Extradition in 
such circumstances, while not explicitly referred to in the brief and general wording of 
Article 3 (art. 3), would plainly be contrary to the spirit and intendment of the Article, and 
in the Court’s view this inherent obligation not to extradite also extends to cases in which 
the fugitive would be faced in the receiving State by a real risk of exposure to inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment proscribed by that Article”.16 
 
What does this lengthy consideration boil down to in strictly positivist terms? 
Article 3 CAT spells out one implication of the prohibition of torture. This 
prohibition of torture is a fundamental value, expressed in general terms in 
Article 3 ECHR. As expulsion resulting in torture would be contrary to this 
value underlying the Convention, it would be contrary to Article 3. In terms 
of means of interpretation, the Court hence states that Article 3 read to 
object and purpose prohibits refoulement. This reading finds, partially, support 
in other sources of international law, notably Article 3 CAT. But only 
partially, for the latter prohibits expulsion only if there is danger of the 
expellee being subjected to “torture”. “In the Court’s view”, under Article 3 
this obligation extends to “inhuman or degrading treatment” - apparently 
solely on the basis of the object and purpose of the provision.   
  
Such a summary, however, does not do justice to the core consideration of 
this landmark case. Noting that the language of this consideration is not 
devoid of rhetorical effects (“the abhorrence of torture”, the Convention as 
“common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of 
law”), we should bear in mind that the Court should not only state how the 
Convention should be interpreted and why, but also convince and persuade 
the national authorities that their treaty obligations under the Convention 
really required so. In this the Court succeeded, because the Soering doctrine 
has been generally accepted. And as regards the strictly legal implications, we 
should not overlook how the Court here creates the possibility for ever wider 
application of the provision. The reasoning hinges on the “fundamental 
value” that “underlies” the provision. This postulate may contain about any 
implication not expressed in the Convention’s text, awaiting identification by 
the Court.  
One such implication the Court identified in Soering concerned its own 
competence to address the case: 
 
“It is not normally for the Convention institutions to pronounce on the existence or 
otherwise of potential violations of the Convention. However, where an applicant claims 
that a decision to extradite him would, if implemented, be contrary to Article 3 by reason 
of its foreseeable consequences in the requesting country, a departure from this principle is 
necessary, in view of the serious and irreparable nature of the alleged suffering risked, in 
order to ensure the effectiveness of the safeguard provided by that Article (see paragraph 
87 above)”.17 
 
                                                
16 Soering, para. 88. 
17 Soering, para. 90. 
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Appeals to the Court are (and were in 1989) admissible only if the applicant 
qualified as a “victim” of a violation of a Convention right.18 Strict 
application of this requirement in expulsion cases would render the 
protection of Article 3 ECHR illusory for true “victims”. “Effectiveness” 
(one of the interpretation principles mentioned by the Court in Soering) 
enables the Court to “depart” from this admissibility criterion, that is, to 
ignore or adapt the wording of the Convention.   
 
VI. The search for a fair balance 
 
The fundamentality of Article 3, combined with the effectiveness 
requirement, secures huge freedom for the Court to extend protection in the 
realm of asylum. But in Soering, it identified also a principle that creates 
freedom to mitigate the implications of the prohibition on expulsion, even 
despite the wording of the Convention: 
  
“What amounts to "inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" depends on all the 
circumstances of the case. Furthermore, inherent in the whole of the Convention is a 
search for a fair balance between the demands of the general interest of the community and 
the requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights. As movement 
about the world becomes easier and crime takes on a larger international dimension, it is 
increasingly in the interest of all nations that suspected offenders who flee abroad should 
be brought to justice. Conversely, the establishment of safe havens for fugitives would not 
only result in danger for the State obliged to harbour the protected person but also tend to 
undermine the foundations of extradition. These considerations must also be included 
among the factors to be taken into account in the interpretation and application of the 
notions of inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment in extradition cases.”19 
 
It turns out that another principle is “inherent to the whole of the 
Convention” - the search for a fair balance. This comes as a surprise after the 
Court’s firm statement that Article 3 ECHR is “absolute”, allows for no 
“interferences” or “derogations”, just a few lines before. As regards Jens 
Soering, this balancing worked as follows. Next to the USA, Germany had 
requested an extradition request to the UK – for Soering was a German 
national. As the death sentence did not exist in Germany, death row and ill-
treatment would not threaten him there. The Court concluded that 
 
“the applicant’s extradition to the United States would expose him to a real risk of 
treatment going beyond the threshold set by Article 3. A further consideration of relevance 
is that in the particular instance the legitimate purpose of extradition could be achieved by 
another means which would not involve suffering of such exceptional intensity or 
duration.”20  
 
Put otherwise, the UK would not strike a fair balance when extraditing 
Soering to the United States, because it had an alternative – extradition to 
Germany – that would satisfy the general interest just as well. 
                                                
18 Article 35 (new), Article 25 (old) ECHR.  
19 Soering, para. 89. 
20 Soering, para. 111. 
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 True, the Court retraced from this particular application of the “fair 
balance” approach in Chahal21 where it ruled that Chahal’s terrorist activities 
are irrelevant in view of the danger of ill-treatment awaiting him upon 
removal. But it can be seen at work in many more.   
 
VII. Allaying the burden  
 
How both approaches interact is nicely illustrated in cases on expulsion of 
very ill people, who receive good medical and social support in the expelling 
State which they risk to lack upon expulsion. According to the Court, these 
cases are different from the type addressed in Soering, because the suffering 
will not be caused by an intentionally inflicted act of ill-treatment, but be due 
to socio-economic circumstances such as poverty and bad health systems 
outside Europe. So these cases fall outside the scope of the Soering doctrine.22 
Nevertheless, “given the fundamental importance of Article 3 in the 
Convention system, the Court must reserve to itself sufficient flexibility to 
address the application of that Article in other contexts”,23 such as medical 
cases. Here “the threshold should remain high”, because 
  
“inherent in the whole of the Convention is a search for a fair balance between the 
demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection 
of the individual's fundamental rights […]. Article 3 does not place an obligation on the 
Contracting State to [provide for] free and unlimited health care to all aliens without a right 
to stay within its jurisdiction. A finding to the contrary would place too great a burden on 
the Contracting States”.24  
 
The fundamentality of Article 3 once more calls for an inclusive 
interpretation, but unwanted consequences – overbearing costs - are checked 
by the working of the fair balance principle.  
This interaction applies to “classic” asylum cases as well, although the 
Court does not explicitly refer to the search for a fair balance. As to the 
examination of appeal to Article 3 in expulsion cases, the Court ruled in 
Vilvarajah that its own scrutiny should be a “rigorous” one, in view of the 
“fundamental character” of the prohibition.25 The same is expected, for the 
same reason, from the States party to the Convention.26 But it falls upon the 
applicant to “show” the grounds why he runs a real risk of ill-treatment: ex 
officio scrutiny of the risk is not required. Hence, its effect is limited – the 
search for a fair balance does apply. 
 
VIII. Prohibitions of refoulement under Articles 6 and 9 ECHR?  
                                                
21 ECtHR 15 November 1996, no. 70/1995/576/602, Rep. 1996-V (Chahal v. UK).  
22 Here I will not address whether this distinction between socio-economic and other 
obligations is a sound one in this context; see H. Battjes, ‘In search for a fair balance 
The absolute character of the prohibition of refoulement under Article 3 ECHR 
reassessed’, (forthcoming).  
23 ECtHR 2 May 1997, 146/1996/767/964 (D. v. UK), para. 49.  
24 ECtHR N. v. UK, para. 45.  
25 ECtHR 30 October 1991, 13163/87 (Vilvarajah), para. 108.  
26 ECtHR 11 July 2007, 40035/98, Rep. 2000-VIII (Jabari v. Turkey). 
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Emphasis on the importance of human rights provisions calling for inclusive 
interpretation, balanced by concern for the burdens of the States party – this 
pattern can also be discerned in the Court’s cautious approach to 
prohibitions of refoulement under other Convention provisions than Article 3. 
Soering had stated that in American criminal proceedings, he would not be 
able to secure legal representation as required by Article 6(3)(c) ECHR. Did 
Article 6 indeed prohibit extradition in case of risk of denial of fair trial in the 
country of destination? The Court reasoned that 
 
“The right to a fair trial in criminal proceedings, as embodied in Article 6 (art. 6), holds a 
prominent place in a democratic society (see, inter alia, the Colozza judgment of 12 
February 1985, Series A no. 89, p. 16, § 32). The Court does not exclude that an issue 
might exceptionally be raised under Article 6 (art. 6) by an extradition decision in 
circumstances where the fugitive has suffered or risks suffering a flagrant denial of a fair 
trial in the requesting country. However, the facts of the present case do not disclose such 
a risk”.27 
 
Although not “fundamental”, Article 6 ECHR is “prominent”; hence, it can 
prohibit expulsion. But the threshold is high: it does so only “exceptionally”, 
in case of a “flagrant denial of fair trial”. In contrast, degrading treatment or 
punishment, the least severe form of ill-treatment prohibited by Article 3 
ECHR, is sufficient to attract the protection of that Article.28  
 The Court further elaborated on the issue in Z and T v UK, on Article 
9 (freedom of religion).29 The Court opposed Article 9 to the “fundamental” 
character of Article 3 (and Article 2).30 It furthermore remarked that  
 
“On a purely pragmatic basis, it cannot be required that an expelling Contracting State only 
return an alien to a country where the conditions are in full and effective accord with each 
of the safeguards of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention.”31  
 
Finally, it suggested that Z and T’s case would also fall outside the scope of 
the Refuge Convention: 
  
“The Contracting States nonetheless have obligations towards those from other 
jurisdictions, imposed variously under the 1951 United Nations Convention on the Status 
of Refugees and under the above-mentioned Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention. As a 
result, protection is offered to those who have a substantiated claim that they will either 
suffer persecution for, inter alia, religious reasons or will be at real risk of death or serious 
ill-treatment, and possibly flagrant denial of a fair trial or arbitrary detention, because of 
their religious affiliation (as for any other reason). Where however an individual claims that 
on return to his own country he would be impeded in his religious worship in a manner 
which falls short of those proscribed levels, the Court considers that very limited 
assistance, if any, can be derived from Article 9 by itself”.   
 
                                                
27 Soering, para. 113.  
28 Soering, para. 88, last clause.   
29 ECtHR 28 February 2006, no. 27034/05 (Z. and T. v. UK) (decision).  
30 The Court found a violation of the prohibition of refoulement under Article 2 in ECtHR 8 
November 2005, no. 13284/04 (Bader v. Sweden).  
31 Emphasis added.  
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Here, the Court takes the same approach to interpretation of Article 9 as it 
does in Soering as regards Article 3, albeit to the opposite effect: a reading to 
object and purpose (informed by an a contrario reasoning to the object and 
purpose of Article 3) in the light of relevant international law reveals that 
Article 9 will normally not prohibit expulsion if there is a real risk that the 
expellee will suffer violation of his freedom of religion in the country of 
origin. The stress on international law – the CCPR and the CAT in Soering; 
the Refugee Convention in Z and T v UK – is telling. Together, these cases 
express the Court’s anxiety both to include refugees into the scope of 
Convention protection, and not to expand this scope too far beyond 
protection obligations the States assumed under other treaties.  
 
IX. The European Court monitoring the Refugee Convention 
 
Slightly exaggerating, one may summarize the legacy of Soering as a 
prohibition of refoulement in cases where, for the most part, other treaties also 
prohibit refoulement. Even so, this legacy has much enriched asylum law in 
Europe.  
The Refugee Convention lacks a monitoring mechanism that can 
oblige states to adopt a certain application. As a consequence, the refugee 
definition is open to ever more restrictive interpretation by the States party. 
The Court’s case-law on Article 3 since Soering fixed a standard for a number 
of issues that came up in asylum law. One example is the issue of agents of 
persecution. In the 1990’s, a number of European states held the view that 
the refugee definition applies only if the protection seeker will be victim of 
persecution acts by a (pseudo) state, not, if he is victim in a situation of 
general unrest and disorder. In this way some of the major refugee crises 
were defined out of the scope of refugee protection – such as Somalia. The 
European Court of Human Rights in a series of ruling stated that absence of 
a state does not preclude application of Article 3 ECHR. This standard now 
also applies, for most European states, to the Refugee Convention 
application too: it has been laid down in the EU Qualification Directive.32 
The dynamic interpretation provided for by the Court on this and other 
issues has made Article 3 ECHR a primary form of protection in Europe. 
Soering’s lasting legacy is adjudication of refugee law by the European Court 
of Human Rights.  
  
X. Balancing an absolute prohibition 
What to think of that other legacy, the identification of interpretation 
principles or approaches that give the Court so much freedom to widen or 
narrow the scope of protection under the prohibition of refoulement? One 
obvious lesson to draw is that a trumpeted extension of protection is unlikely 
to come without a silent escape. This may be deplored by those who view 
human rights in general, and Article 3 ECHR in particular, as the expression 
of human dignity, and balancing in this context as something close to 
betrayal of that dignity. It may be applauded by those with a realist view on 
                                                
32 Article 6. 
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international law who appreciate balancing as a wise limitation on 
Convention obligations to the extent the States party are willing to accept 
them. In either case, one must accept that concepts like absoluteness or 
balancing are unreliable. 
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